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Abstract
Should health care provision be public, private, or both? We look at this question in a
setting where people differ in their earnings capacity and face some illness risk. We assume
that illness reduces a persons time endowment when waiting for treatment. Treatment can be
obtained in a competitive private sector (through private insurance) or in the National Health
Service (NHS) where it is provided free of charge but after some (endogenous) waiting time.
The equilibrium in the health care sector consists of a waiting time in the NHS such that no
patient wants to switch health care provider. This equilibrium is governed by two public poli-
cies: the income tax system and the size of the NHS. Our findings are threefold. First, a mixed
system with a small public health care sector always gives a lower social welfare than a pure
public system. Second, a mixed system with a sufficiently large NHS may improve upon a pure
public system if the dispersion of earnings capacities is large enough. And finally, when health
risk is negatively correlated with ability, there is an extra argument for a large NHS.
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1 Introduction
In several OECD countries, health care is mainly provided publicly and financed
out of tax revenue or social insurance contributions. Examples are Norway, Swe-
den and the United Kingdom. In these countries, there also exists a parallel
private health care sector. In Norway, this private sector is still small, but expe-
rience from other countries suggests that it may grow to a significant level. In
the UK, where the NHS is free of charge, the proportion of private expenditure
in total expenditure on health care has grown from 9% in 1979 to 15% in 1995
(Propper, 2000). The other extreme is a health care system mainly financed by
private means, as in the US (and Switzerland, up til 1995).
There exists by now a large literature collecting the arguments in favour
and against public and private health care systems. The papers by Besley and
Gouveia (1994), Cullis et al (2000), Propper and Green (2001) are examples.
This literature covers many dimensions: from eﬃciency and equity to political
sustainability and administration. The purpose of our paper is more modest in
the sense that we want to construct a formal and consistent framework within
which we can discuss some, but certainly not all, dimensions in the debate on a
‘private vs public’ health care system. Our concern in this paper is to examine
whether a mixed system, in which public and private sectors coexist, can be
superior, on equity grounds, to a fully public system.
It was indeed claimed by Besley and Coate (1991) that when there are
limits to redistribution, such mixed system can be socially optimal for providing
private goods like education or health care. In their framework, such private
goods can either be acquired free of charge from the public sector or be bought
at a price in the private sector. If the quality level in the public sector is lower
than in the private market, some people will be willing to pay for a higher-
quality good in the private sector. Furthermore, if quality is a normal good,
these individuals will also have the highest incomes. Besley and Coate show
that in such framework public provision of the private good can redistribute
income from rich to poor when it is financed by a head tax levied on all citizens
irrespective of the sector they resort to. Whereas their argument is presented
in general terms, our purpose in this paper is to verify whether it still applies
when some specifities of health care are accounted for.
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We consider an economy where citizens diﬀer in earning capacity and face
the risk of needing a well-defined medical treatment once a year. For receiving
treatment they can either resort to the NHS (i.e. the public health care sector)
or sign a private health insurance policy that delivers them treatment on the
spot. In the former case, health care is free of charge but rationing takes place
through waiting lists. In the latter, the competitive price mechanism makes
demand compatible with supply. In equilibrium, no citizen wants to change
health care provider. In particular, all citizens with a earnings capacity below
a certain level will resort to the NHS while the others buy a private insurance
policy. Thus, in this paper we will ignore the information asymmetries between
patients, physicians and health insurers, causing moral hazard, adverse selection
and risk selection problems. Those are important issues in the markets for
health care, and the only justification for not including them in our setting is
to develop a tractable model for studying the equity issues we focus on in this
paper.
We analyse the arguments that a welfare maximizing government should
account for when deciding on the size of the NHS and the parameters of a
linear income tax scheme. In this respect, a key question is whether a mixed
health care system is desirable. There are deadweight losses in a mixed system:
these are due to the waiting lists that cause discomfort, inconvenience and even
more painful complications to patients. In our setting waiting lists provoke
deadweight losses of resources in the form of shorter time available for leisure
and labour. A mixed system is only desirable if the benefits of redistribution
outweigh those deadweight losses. Our main conclusions are threefold. First, a
mixed health care system with a small NHS is never desirable. If the size of the
NHS is too small, the social benefits are of second order importance relative to
the associated social costs. Second, it may be optimal to have a mixed system
that include a large enough NHS, but a necessary condition for this is that the
spread in the income distribution is suﬃciently wide. Otherwise, it is optimal to
have a fully public system covering the needs of the whole population. Third,
when individual health risk is negatively correlated with earnings capability,
there is a further argument for a large NHS: a more equitable risk pooling
arrangement.
In our setting, it is noteworthy that if there were no limits to redistribu-
tion, that is if lump-sum income taxes and transfers could be diﬀerentiated by
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individual abilities, an indiﬀerence between the pure private and public sys-
tems would obtain in the absence of any correlation between health risk and
ability while a fully public system would be superior to any other system in
the presence of a negative correlation. This emphasizes that when it is socially
optimal to operate a mixed system, it is because it allows to move the limits
to redistribution beyond those implementable through feasible tax-and-transfer
policies.
Analytical work on these issues is both recent and sparse. We mention two
contributions related to our paper. Iversen (1997) lets patients diﬀer in their
income and the expected health benefit of treatment. He looks at the eﬀect of
a private sector on the waiting time for treatment in public hospitals. When
patients are admitted to a waiting list without consideration of the expected
health benefit of treatment, Iversen shows that the presence of a private sector
results in a longer waiting time if the demand for treatment in public hospitals
is suﬃciently elastic with respect to waiting time. When waiting list admissions
are rationed, the waiting time is shown to increase if public-sector physicians
are allowed to work in the private sector in their spare time.
The model developed by Hoel and Sæther (2000) is closer to ours. They
have patients diﬀering in their willingness to wait for treatment. There is a
public health sector where patients are put on a waiting list and are treated
at a constant marginal cost. But patients have also the option to turn to a
private sector where the marginal cost of treatment is at least as high as in the
public sector. They find that it may be optimal to have an active private sector
if there is suﬃcient inequality in patient’s willingness to spend time waiting.
They also discuss the optimal level of subsidy of private care and how the size
of that subsidy aﬀects the political support for a public health system with a
lower waiting time.
The paper is organized as follows. First we discuss patients’ choice of re-
sorting to either the NHS or a private insurance contract (Section 2). Next,
we study in our basic model how the equilibrium in the health care sector de-
termines the waiting time in the NHS (Section 3). Thereafter, we set up the
normative problem (Section 4) and analyse the optimality properties of the size
of the NHS (if a mixed system is desirable) and the linear tax policy. We
then provide numerical simulations to assess the desirability of a mixed system
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(Section 5). Finally, we extend the basic model by allowing for discomfort of
illness as well as a health risk that depends negatively on ability (Section 6).
Concluding remarks are oﬀered in Section 7.
2 The basic model
In the simplest setting developed in this paper, citizens only care about their
consumption of a composite good and leisure, denoted by c and ` respectively.
Their preferences on these two goods are described by a strictly concave utility
function u(c, `). There is some probability, denoted by π, that any individual
will suﬀer from illness, in which case his or her labour productivity diminishes.
In our setting it takes the form of a reduction in the individual’s time endowment
available for labour and leisure. This time endowment is equal to A for an
individual in good health and to A− λ(w) for an individual being sick, where
λ(w) is the loss of time caused by illness. This increases with w, the time a sick
person has to wait before receiving medical treatment. This function satisfies
the following properties: λ(0) = 0, λ0(w) > 0 and λ00(w) ≥ 0.
Citizens diﬀer in their earnings ability denoted by a. This is distributed on
the support [a, a] according to distribution function F (a) with density function
f(a) > 0 for any a ∈ (a, a). Let L denote an individual’s labour supply. Labour
earnings (aL) are subjected to a linear income tax characterized by a constant
marginal tax rate, denoted by t, and a lump-sum transfer, denoted by T . Thus
the available income of an individual of ability a amounts to (1−t)aL+T while
his or her leisure time, `, is equal to either A − L in case of good health or
A− λ(w)− L in case of illness.
A citizen can choose to receive medical treatment either in the NHS or in
a private practice (whose fee is covered by a private insurance contract), this
choice being made before the state of health is known. There is free access to
the NHS that is financed out of income tax revenue. However, a sick person
having opted for the NHS will be put on a waiting list before receiving medical
treatment. The optimal labour supply of an individual having chosen the NHS
will depend upon his or her state of health since his or her time endowment will
depend upon it. Whatever the state of health, it satisfies (1−t)a∂u/∂c = ∂u/∂`.
Using index Ng and Nb for NHS in the good and bad health states respectively,
this yields the following conditional labour supply and indirect utility functions:
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LNg = L((1− t)a, T,A) and LNb = L((1− t)a, T,A− λ(w)) (1.1)
vNg = v((1− t)a, T,A) and vNb = v((1− t)a, T,A− λ(w)) (1.2)
where the three arguments of these functions are the net-of-tax wage rate, the
lump-sum transfer and the time endowment depending upon the health status.
The above indirect utility functions satisfy the well known Roy identities:
vit = −aLiviT , i = Ng,Nb, (2.1)
where viT is the marginal utility of income and subscripts denote partial deriv-
atives. We also have:
vNbλ = −(1− t)avNbT . (2.2)
The expected indirect utility of an individual having chosen to be treated in
the NHS in case of illness is given by:
EvN = (1− π)vNg + πvNb (3)
where (to recall) π stands for the probability of falling sick.
On the other hand, if an individual opts for a private insurance policy, he
or she will be given medical treatment on the spot (λ(w) = 0) but will have
to pay a fee-for-service q. We assume that competitive insurance contracts are
available that provide full coverage of this risk. Therefore the labour supply and
indirect utility functions do not depend upon the individual’s state of health.
The insurance premium being πq, they are given by:
LP = L((1− t)a, T − πq,A) (4.1)
and
vP = v((1− t)a, T − πq,A) (4.2)
where upperscript P refers to private medicine. Note that the second argument
is T − πq (instead of T ) to account for the fact that individuals opting for a
private insurance have their income available for consumption of the composite
good reduced by the insurance premium. As earlier, the indirect utility satisfies
vPt = −aLP vPT . (5)
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We now turn to the individual’s choice of the health care provider. If EvN ≥ vP
the individual opts for the NHS; if EvN < vP , he or she opts for a private
health insurance policy. Since EvN and vP depend upon ability a through the
individual’s income, this choice diﬀers across ability types. Throughout the
paper we maintain the following normality assumption.
Assumption N. For any t, T and w, there exists some critical ability level aˆ
such that
EvN ≥ vP for any a ≤ aˆ,
EvN < vP for any a > aˆ.
In other words, the least able persons opt for the NHS while the most able ones
opt for private medicine.
This assumption simply means that the quality of health care — here inversely
related to waiting time — is a normal good. This is in line with the empirical
literature that shows that the quality of care provided rises with income.
3 The comparative statics of the waiting time in the
NHS
At the end of the previous section, attention was focused on the critical ability
level aˆ and so on the proportion of individuals resorting to the NHS, F (aˆ),
for a given tax system (t and T ) and a given waiting time in the NHS (w).
This enables us to determine the size of the NHS, that is the supply of NHS
services, needed to satisfy demand. With S denoting this size, we simply have
S = πF (aˆ).
However, when formulating the government’s problem in the next section,
the size of the NHS will be taken as a government decision variable (together
with t and T ). What will then matter is how the waiting time adjusts for the
demand for NHS services to clear their supply (S). This reflects the idea exposed
in the introduction that in our setting, the waiting time for being treated in the
NHS is used as a rationing device. Since aˆ = F−1(S/π), choosing S amounts
to choosing aˆ. Therefore, in the rest of this section, we shall investigate the
comparative statics of the waiting time in the NHS with respect to aˆ, t and T ,
the results of which will be used in the next section.
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To this end, let us first define ∆(aˆ, t, T, w) as:
∆(aˆ, t, T, w)
def
= v((1− t)aˆ, T − πq,A)− (1− π)v((1− t)aˆ, T,A)
−πv((1− t)aˆ, T,A− λ(w)) = 0 (6)
where the equality to 0 is due to the indiﬀerence of individuals of ability aˆ
between a private insurance and the NHS (vP −EvN = 0 for these individuals).
Remark that Assumption N implies:
d∆
daˆ
= (1− t)
·
LˆP vˆPT − (1− π)LˆNgvˆ
Ng
T − πLˆ
NbvˆNbT
¸
> 0, (7.1)
where a hat on a function means that it is taken at a = aˆ. We also have:
∂∆
∂w
= π(1− t)aˆ vˆNbT λ0(w) > 0, (7.2)
∂∆
∂t
= − aˆ
1− t
∂∆
∂aˆ
< 0 (7.3)
and
∂∆
∂T
= vˆPT − (1− π)vˆ
Ng
T − π vˆ
Nb
T . (7.4)
Using the above derivatives we obtain the following comparative static results:
∂w
∂aˆ
= − d∆/daˆ
d∆/dw
< 0, (8.1)
dw
dt
= − ∂∆/∂t
∂∆/∂w
> 0, (8.2)
and
∂w
∂T
= −∂∆/∂T
∂∆/∂w
≶ 0. (8.3)
A key consequence of Assumption N is that an increase in aˆ, and so in the size
of the NHS, causes the equilibrium waiting time to fall.
4 The government’s problem
To evaluate social welfare, we assume the following social welfare function de-
fined over expected utilities:
SW
def
=
Z aˆ
a
ψ(a)EvN (a)dF (a) +
Z a
aˆ
ψ(a)vP (a)dF (a)
where the weight ψ(a) is non-increasing in ability. The advantage of this formu-
lation over the more standard concave transformation of (expected) utilities is
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that it allows for an explicit solution to the optimal tax problem in the numeri-
cal examples we present later on (see also Deaton, 1983). Besides the utilitarian
case (ψ(a) = 1, ∀ a), it contains the rank-ordered social welfare function as a
special case. In the latter, ψ(a) = 1 − F (a), such that the worst oﬀ agent
gets unit weight, the person in the F -th percentile gets weight 1− F , and the
best-oﬀ agent gets weight zero. It can be shown that social welfare can then be
written as the product of the mean of the utility distribution and concentration
measure equal to “1 − the Gini-coeﬃcient of the utility distribution”.
As already mentioned, the government ought to choose the size of the NHS,
which is equivalent to choosing aˆ, and the parameters of the linear income tax
system, t and T . They are the solution to the following problem:
max
aˆ,t,T
SW ≡
Z aˆ
a
ψ(a)
·
(1− π) v((1− t)a, T,A) + πv((1− t)a, T,A
− λ(w(aˆ, t, T ))
¸
dF (a)+
Z a
aˆ
ψ(a)v((1−t)a, T−πq,A)dF (a) (9)
subject to
t
Z aˆ
a
a
·
(1−π)L((1−t)a, T,A) + πL((1−t)a, T,A−λ(w(aˆ, t, T ))
¸
dF (a)
+t
Z a
aˆ
aL((1−t)a, T−πq,A)dF (a)− T−R−πqF (aˆ)≥0, (10)
where R is the exogenously fixed amount of public expenditures for other pur-
poses than income redistribution and the NHS. Note that the last term on the
lhs of the budget constraint, πqF (aˆ), is the overall cost of the NHS. Therefore, q
is assumed to be both the price of medical treatment in the competitive private
market and its unit cost in the NHS.
The optimal size of the NHS can correspond to either one of two corner
solutions or an interior solution. At these two corner solutions health care is
provided by either only the NHS (aˆ = a) or only private medicine (aˆ = a).
However in our basic setting the social welfare function takes the same value at
these corner solutions. The reason is twofold: first, waiting lists are not needed
to ration the demand for the NHS-services when citizens cannot opt for a private
practice (which corresponds to the upper corner solution aˆ = a)1 and, second,
it is equivalent for citizens to pay for their expected cost of medical treatment
1The function w(ba), implicitly defined by (6), exhibits a discontinuity at ba = a where its
drops to zero.
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through either an insurance premium (πq) at the lower corner solution (aˆ = a)
or through a reduction in T of the same magnitude at the upper corner solution
(aˆ = a). It is worth mentioning that this equivalence between the two corner
solutions will not longer hold in the extension of the basic model that we will
present in Section 6.
Whether the optimal size of the NHS corresponds to an interior or corner
solution will be crucial in the next section where numerical results will be pre-
sented. For the time being our purpose in the remainder of this section is to
characterize interior solutions to the government’s problem formulated above.
The solution to this problem is formally derived in the Appendix. Here we
focus on the interpretation of the results, looking first at the optimal choice of
the NHS size. Denoting by L the Lagrangian of the government’s maximiza-
tion problem and by µ the multiplier of its budget constraint, the following
expression is derived in the appendix:
1
µ
∂L
∂aˆ
= −π
Z aˆ
a
·
(1− t)aBNb(a) + ta
¸
dF (a)λ0(w)
∂w
∂aˆ
+
½
taˆ
·
πLˆNb + (1− π)LˆNg − LˆP
¸
− πq
¾
f(aˆ) (11)
where
BNb(a) ≡ 1
µ
ψ(a)vNbT + taL
Nb
T (12)
is the net marginal social valuation of the income of a person of ability a who
has opted for the NHS and is sick. Since everything in this expression has been
divided by µ, it is expressed in terms of government revenue.
The economic interpretation of the expression on the rhs of (11) is straight-
forward. The first term accounts for the fact that an increase in aˆ (and so in
the size of the NHS) causes the time endowment of the sick persons resorting
to the NHS to rise by −λ0(w)dwdaˆ > 0 since the waiting time diminishes. This
has an income eﬀect that amounts to (1 − t)a for a person of ability a, which
is valued at BNb(a), and also a direct eﬀect on the tax revenue collected from
such a person that amounts to ta. The second term in (11) reflects the bud-
getary implications for the government of those individuals withdrawing from
the private insurance market. On the one hand, π q stands for the government’s
additional expected health expenditures per switching individual. On the other
hand, those switching individuals change their (expected) labour supply by
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πLˆNb + (1 − π)LˆNg − LˆP < 0. This negative sign comes from the assumption
that the composite commodity and leisure are normal goods and the facts that
the switching individuals have their time endowment reduced and do no longer
need to pay an insurance premium.
Evaluating (11) for a = a leaves us with no benefits and only budgetary
costs. Therefore, introducing a small NHS sector is harmful for social welfare.
As expression (11) indicates, this result is explained by the number of NHS
patients, F (aˆ), who benefit from the fall in waiting time when the size of the
NHS is increased, relative to the number of patients, f(aˆ), who shift from the
private sector to the NHS and so negatively aﬀect the government’s budget bal-
ance. When the NHS is of small size, there are only a few individuals benefiting
from the fall in waiting time, and so the social cost of an increase in this size
outweighs its social benefit.2 The same reasoning also explains why the social
benefit of an increase in the NHS size can dominate its social cost when the size
of the NHS is large enough: there are then enough patients who benefit from
the reduction in waiting time.
If it is optimal to have a strictly positive NHS, the welfare eﬀects of a reduc-
tion in waiting time should at the margin balance its budgetary implications.
Setting therefore (11) to zero and rearranging gives us:
πE
£
(1− t)aBNb(a) + ta | a ≤ aˆ¤λ0(w)µ−∂w
∂aˆ
¶
t
£
Lˆp − πLˆNb − (1− π)LˆNg
¤
+
πq
aˆ
=
aˆf(aˆ)
F (aˆ)
. (13)
The lhs is the ratio of the benefit per NHS patient of the rise in aˆ (again
measured in units of government revenue) to its budgetary cost per patient
moving to the NHS, while the rhs is the elasticity of the distribution function
at aˆ. For many familiar distribution functions, this elasticity falls in aˆ.
2This reasoning is valid when f(a) > 0. When f(a) = 0, ∂L∂ba |ba=a = 0, and we need to
investigate the sign of ∂
2L
∂ba2 |ba=a. Since ∂2L∂ba2 |ba=a = µ{tba[πbLNb + (1− π)bLNg − bLP ]− πq} bf |ba=a,
and the square bracket term is negative due to Assumption N, we can claim that ∂
2L
∂ba2 |ba=a < 0.
Initially, social welfare is therefore a concave fucntion of ba, and will never increase with ba at
a.
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In the next section we construct numerical examples showing that in some
circumstances it can be socially optimal to have a mixed health sector, involv-
ing both a NHS for the least able persons and private medicine for the most
able persons. For the sake of completeness, we close the present section by
characterising the optimal linear tax policy. The following expression of the
marginal tax rate is derived in the appendix:
t =
−cov(B(a), aL)−
·
πF (aˆ)E
£
(1− t)aBNb + ta | a ≤ aˆ¤λ0(w)µ∂w
∂t
−E[aL]∂w
∂T
¶¸
(
−E
"
a
∂L˜
∂t
#)
(14)
where the covariance, cov(B(a), aL), is taken over the full interval [a, a] and for
the individuals resorting to the NHS over the two states of health, and B(a) can
be equal to BNb(a), BNg(a) or BP (a) according to the ability of the individual
and his or her state of health (the last two being defined like BNb(a) in (12)). In
the above expression, ∂L˜∂t stands for the income-compensated (or substitution)
eﬀect on labour supply of a change in t: ∂L˜∂t =
∂L
∂t + aL
∂L
∂T < 0.
Expression (14) is a modified Sheshinski (1972)-rule for the optimal marginal
income tax rate. If we had only the first term in the numerator, we would
have the standard ratio that trades oﬀ equity considerations (numerator) with
eﬃciency considerations (denominator). The second term in the numerator of
(14) is new and has to do with the eﬀect on the waiting time of a change in
the marginal tax rate. If this eﬀect is negative, this second term pushes up the
value of the marginal tax rate. However, it is diﬃcult to say a priori how an
increase in the marginal tax rate, accompanied by a decrease in the lum-sum
transfer (T ) intended to balance the government budget, will aﬀect the waiting
time.3
5 Numerical examples of the basic model
Throughout this section, we represent individual preferences by the following
Cobb-Douglas utility function: u(c, `) = [(ββ(1 − β)1−β]−1cβ`1−β. This speci-
fication yields the following labour supply and indirect utility functions for an
3We have indeed ∂w∂t − E[aL]
∂w
∂T = {vˆ
P
T [aˆLˆ
P − E[aL]] − πvˆNbT [aˆLˆNb − E[aL]] − (1 −
π)vˆNgT [aˆLˆ
Ng − E[aL]]}[λ0(w)vˆNbT (1 − t)aˆ]−1. The expression in curly brackets is in general
diﬃcult to sign.
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individual of ability a having opted for the NHS:
LNg = βA− (1− β)[(1− t)a]−1T,
LNb = β[A− λ(w)]− (1− β)[(1− t)a]−1T (15.1)
and vNg = [(1− t)a]βA+ [(1− t)a]β−1T,
vNb = [(1− t)a]β[A− λ(w)] + [(1− t)a]β−1T. (15.2)
For an individual of ability a having opted for a private insurance these functions
are:
LP = βA− (1− β)[(1− t)a]−1(T − πq) (16.1)
and vP = [(1− t)a]βA+ [(1− t)a]β−1(T − πq). (16.2)
From relation (6) it is easy to derive that the equilibrium level of waiting time
satisfies the following condition:
λ(w) = [(1− t)aˆ]−1q. (17)
Since in the basic model w aﬀects individuals only through λ(w) one can dis-
pense with choosing a particular functional form for λ(w).
Using the above labour supply functions and substituting λ(w) from (17),
the budget constraint given in (10) yields after a few manipulations:
T =
1−t
1−βt
·
tβE(a)A−πqF (aˆ)−R+ t
1− tπq
½
(1−β)(1−F (aˆ))−β
Z aˆ
a
a
aˆ
dF (a)
¾¸
.
(18)
This is the Laﬀer curve, expressing the lump-sum transfer, T , in terms of
the marginal tax rate, t, and the critical level of ability, aˆ (and so the size of
the NHS, πF (aˆ)).4
Likewise, using the indirect utility functions derived above and substituting
again λ(w) from (17), we obtain the following expression for the social welfare
4The first three rhs terms are obvious: the first is the direct revenue eﬀect of the marginal
tax rate, while the second and third are government revenue requirements. The two terms
in curly brackets take account of the fact that: (i) people with a private insurance policy
tend to increase their labour supply and income tax payments due to the income eﬀect of the
insurance premium, and (ii) people on the NHS waiting list supply less labour and therefore
generate less tax revenue.
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given in (9):
SW = (1− t)βE[ψ(a)aβ]A+ (1− t)β−1E[ψ(a)aβ−1]T
−πq(1− t)β−1
"Z aˆ
a
ψ(a)aβ
aˆ
dF (a) +
Z a
aˆ
ψ(a)aβ−1dF (a)
#
, (19)
in which T can be substituted from (18) in order to express SW in terms of t
and aˆ alone, i.e. SW (t, aˆ).
Setting the derivative of SW (t, aˆ) w.r.t. t equal to zero results in a third-
degree polynomial in t having three roots. It is the lowest root that corresponds
to the optimal marginal tax rate: t(aˆ) (see Appendix). Next, we can trace out
the behaviour of the function SW (t(aˆ), aˆ) that depicts the highest level of SW
in terms of aˆ.
In all our numerical examples, β is chosen equal to .4, πq is set at 0.05, the
time endowment A is normalised to one and the distribution of ability in the
population is chosen such that the average ability is equal to one: E[a] = 1. The
value for R is .3: it is 30% potential income (A times the average wage rate).
The dispersion of ability in the population turns out to be a key parameter. It is
captured by means of D defined as the ratio of the highest ability to the lowest
ability: D ≡ a/a. We have considered three ability distributions: the uniform
distribution (F (a) = a−aa−a), the log-uniform distribution (F (a) =
log a−log a
log a−log a),
and the Beta (2,5) distribution (F (a) =
R a
a
1
B(2,5)
1
a−a
x−a
a−a
³
a−x
a−a
´
dx). The latter
two are skewed to the right; the density of the log-uniform is monotonically
decreasing, while that of the Beta(2,5) distribution is bell-shaped. Of these
three distributions, the last one is the most relevant on empirical gounds. Fig-
ure 1 below gives the Beta(2,5) density function for D = 100 with support
[a, a] = [.034, 3.41].
As it was analytically shown in the previous section, social welfare dimin-
ishes when aˆ is raised from 0 to a small positive amount. It implies that a
mixed system can only be optimal if the size of the NHS is large enough. It also
means that the social welfare function is not everywhere concave in aˆ when a
mixed system is socially desirable. The shape of the social welfare curve is then
as illustrated in Figure 2 where the local interior maximum of the curve does
correspond to its global maximum. However, the curve may also be U -shaped
or have its global maximum diﬀerent from its local interior maximum. In both
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Figure 1: The Beta (2,5) density function with mean normalised to 1.
 SW 
a            a   
Figure 2: Shape of SW (t(ba),ba): the case of an optimal mixed system.
these cases, a mixed system is not desirable. As a matter of fact, according
to our numerical examples, the dispersion parameter of the ability distribution
(D) needs to be suﬃciently large for a mixed system to be welfare optimal.
This will be shown in the next tables.
In the tables below, we give the optimal tax policy and the NHS size for the
minimal value of D for which a mixed system dominates a pure NHS or pure
private system (remember that these two pure cases are in terms of resource
allocation and social welfare equivalent) as well as for some higher values of
D. The DWL figure (deadweight loss) indicates by how much, expressed as
a percentage of actual GDP, we should decrease the value of R, that is the
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exogenous government expenditure, for the pure (NHS or private) system to
give the same amount of social welfare as the mixed system.5
For instance, Table 1 reads as follows. With a utilitarian objective, the
lowest value of D for which a mixed system becomes optimal is 35. For this
value of D, the Gini coeﬃcient of the ability distribution is .315. A pure (NHS
or private) system or a mixed system where 9.8% of the population resorts to
the NHS are socially equivalent. Note that as D rises the optimal value of F (aˆ)
suddenly jumps from 0 to 9,8% at D = 35. This reflects the non-concavity
of the social welfare function as illustrated in Figure 2. However, with a rank-
ordered social welfare function, a mixed system where 19.3% resorts to the NHS
performs strictly better than a pure system: we would have to reduce R by 1.6%
of GDP for a pure system to generate the same social welfare level as the mixed
system. When D is as low as 17, a pure system performs as well as a mixed
one in which 18 % of the population goes to the NHS.
Utilitarian SW Rank order SW
D Gini F (aˆ) t T DWL F (aˆ) t T DWL
17 .296 0 or 100% .40 -0.8 0 18.0 % .64 .005 0
35 .315 9.8 % .46 -.06 0 19.3 % .70 .01 1.6%
70 .324 11.4 % .51 -.04 0.6% 18.1 % .75 .02 3.2%
120 .327 11.4 % .54 -.03 1.0% 17.5 % .77 .02 4.4%
250 .330 11.2 % .57 -.02 1.6% 16.7 % .80 .03 5.8%
1000 .332 10.4 % .61 -.01 2.3% 14.9 % .83 .04 7.8%
Table 1: Uniform ability distribution: numerical results with constant π
Utilitarian SW Rank order SW
D Gini F (aˆ) t T DWL F (aˆ) t T DWL
51 .531 0 or 100% .69 -.02 0 54.1 % .82 .011 0
128 .603 54.2 % .77 -.00 0 52.1 % .91 .02 6.0%
150 .614 53.9 % .78 -.01 0.5% 51.7 % .93 .02 7.6%
180 .626 53.6 % .80 -.01 1.2% 53.2% .96 .02 10.6%
250 .645 52.8 % .83 -.02 2.7% 57.8% .97 .02 16.5%
5More precisely, DWL def= R−R
GDP (pure NHS;R)
100 where R solves SW (optimal mixed
system;R) = SW (pure NHS;R)
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Table 2: Log-uniform ability distribution: numerical results with constant π
Utilitarian SW Rank order SW
D Gini F (aˆ) t T DWL F (aˆ) t T DWL
63.5 .298 0 or 100% .37 -.10 0 2.6 % .62 -.002 0
134 .306 0.5 % .39 -.09 0 5.8 % .64 .002 0.3%
250 .310 1.3% .40 -.08 0.03% 6.8 % .65 .004 0.5%
1000 .313 2.1 % .42 -.08 0.1% 7.1 % .67 .007 0.8%
Table 3: Beta(2,5) ability distribution: numerical results with constant π
As the tables show, whether a mixed system is superior to a pure one very
much depends upon the specification of the social welfare function as well as that
of the ability distribution. This is not surprising since in our setting the driving
force towards a mixed system is to redistribute real income across individuals of
diﬀerent abilities. As expected a mixed system is more likely to be optimal when
the more redistribution-oriented rank order social welfare function represent
the preferences of society. As already mentioned the dispersion of the ability
distribution also plays an important role: it must be large enough for a mixed
system to be optimal. However, the shape of the ability distribution matters
as well in the determination of the optimal NHS size when a mixed system
is superior to a pure one. A comparison of our results for the log-uniform
distribution and the beta one shows this very clearly.
Another interesting conclusion we infer from our numerical examples is that
while the optimal marginal tax rate (t) is always monotonically increasing with
the dispersion of the ability distribution (D), the optimal NHS size in case of
a mixed system is not monotonic in D. Therefore, the marginal tax rate and
the NHS size can be either complements or substitutes in redistributing real
income across individuals of diﬀerent abilities.
6 Extension of the basic model
In this section we modify in two respects the basic setting developed in the pre-
vious sections. First, in addition to its eﬀect on time endowments the presence
of waiting lists in the NHS directly aﬀects the utility of individuals having opted
for this health system. Let r(w) denote their non-pecuniary and additive loss
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of utility in case of illness with r0(w) > 0 and r00(w) > 0. Second, a negative
correlation of ability and illness risk is accounted for. There is indeed empirical
evidence of this negative correlation. To simplify the presentation we assume
that the probability of illness depends upon a in a deterministic way: π(a) with
π0(a) < 0. For the sake of simplicity, we also rule out any adverse selection
in the insurance markets. For an individual of ability a the private insurance
premium is thus π(a)q.
Let the indirect utility, v(·), be defined in the same way as in Section 2, there-
fore not including the non-pecuniary loss of utility r(w). Then, ∆(aˆ, t, T, w)
given in (6) in the basic model is now defined by:
∆(aˆ, t, T,w) ≡ v((1−t)aˆ, T−π(aˆ)q,A)−(1−π(aˆ))v((1−t)aˆ, T,A)
−π(aˆ)
·
v((1−t)aˆ, T,A−λ(w))−r(w)
¸
= 0. (20)
Diﬀerentiating this expression yields
∂∆
∂aˆ
= (1− t)
·
(LˆP vˆPT − (1− π(aˆ))LˆNgvˆ
Ng
T
¸
−π(aˆ)LˆNbvˆNbT + π0(aˆ)
·
− qvˆPT + (vˆNg − vˆNb) + r(w)
¸
,
> 0 by assumption, (21.1)
∂∆
∂w
= π(aˆ)
·
(1− t)aˆλ0(w)vˆNbT + r0(w)
¸
> 0, (21.2)
with ∂∆/∂t and d∆/dT being defined in the same way as in (7.3) and (7.4).
The eﬀects of aˆ, t and T on w are obtained as in (8).
The government’s optimization problem is now written as:
maxba,t,T SW =
Z aˆ
a
·
(1− π(a))v((1− t)a, T,A) + π(a)v((1− t)a, T,A
− λ(w(aˆ, t, T ))) + π(a)r(w(aˆ, t, T ))
¸
dF (a)
+
Z a
aˆ
v((1− t)a, T − π(a)q,A)dF (a) (22)
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subject to:
t
Z aˆ
a
a
·
(1− π(a))L((1− t)a, T,A) + π(a)L((1− t)a, T,A
− λ(w(aˆ, t, T )))
¸
dF (a) + t
Z a
aˆ
aL((1− t)a, T − π(a)q,A)dF (a)
−T −R− q
Z aˆ
a
π(a)dF (a) ≥ 0. (23)
Proceeding in the same way as in the appendix for the basic setting we
obtain the following condition for the optimal choice of aˆ (and so of the NHS
size: S = q
Z aˆ
a
π(a)dF (a) ):
E
·
π(a)
©
(1− t)aBNb(a) + ta
ª
λ0(w) + π(a)r0(w) | a ≤ aˆ
¸µ
−dw
daˆ
¶
t
·
Lˆp − π(aˆ)LˆNb − (1− π(aˆ))LˆNg
¸
+
π(aˆ)q
aˆ
=
aˆf(aˆ)
F (aˆ)
,
(24)
which is the equivalent of (13) in the basic setting. Likewise, the optimal choice
of the marginal tax rate t satisfies:
t = (25)
−cov(β, aL)− F (aˆ)E
·
π(a)
©
(1−t)aBNb+ta
ª
λ0(w)+π(a)r0(w) |a≤ aˆ
³¸
∂w
∂t−E[aL]
∂w
∂T
´
E
·
a∂L˜∂t
¸
which is the equivalent of (14) in the basic model.
Except for the introduction of r(w) and of π(a) instead of π, conditions
(24) and (25) are very close to their counterparts in the basic model. However
the main diﬀerence lies in that the pure NHS (upper corner solution: aˆ = a)
now yields a higher value for social welfare than the pure private system (lower
corner solution: aˆ = a ). This is because the former operates a redistribution
from low- to high-risk individuals. While the premium in the private insurance
market depends upon risk and is thus higher for a low-ability individual than
for a high-ability one (because of the negative correlation between ability and
risk), all health expenditures are financed by means of progressive income taxes
in the pure NHS. This redistributive consideration also makes it, ceteris paribus,
more attractive to have a larger NHS sector in any mixed system.
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For the numerical simulations below, we assume that
π(a) = π(a)
a− a
a− a + π(a)
a− a
a− a
with π(a) = .55 and π(a) = .45. In other words, we took a 10% diﬀerence in
health risk between the most and the least able person. Except for this change
we use the same specifications and parameter values as in the previous section.
In particular, we assume r(w) = 0, ∀ w and E[π(a)]qE[a]A = .05.
Utilitarian SW Rank order SW
D Gini F (aˆ) t T DWL F (aˆ) t T DWL
28 .310 100% .44 -.06 0 20.0 % .68 .00 0
60 .322 11.7 % .50 -.05 0 19.5 % .73 .01 1.6 %
120 .327 11.3 % .54 -.03 0.5% 18.0 % .76 .02 3.1 %
250 .330 11.2 % .57 -.03 1.1% 16.7 % .79 .03 4.4 %
1000 .332 10.4% .60 -.01 1.8% 15.4 % .82 .03 6.2 %
Table 4: Numerical results: uniform ability distribution with variable π
Utilitarian SW Rank order SW
D Gini F (aˆ) t T DWL F (aˆ) t T DWL
69 .557 100% .72 .03 0 54.7 % .84 .01 0
164 .620 54.7 % .79 .01 0 51.8 % .92 .02 6.4 %
180 .626 54.4 % .80 .01 0.3 % 51.5 % .94 .02 7.4 %
Table 5: Numerical results: log-uniform ability distribution with variable π
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Utilitarian SW Rank order SW
D Gini F (aˆ) t T DWL F (aˆ) t T DWL
280 .311 100% .65 -.04 0 6.8 % .65 .00 0
1000 .313 100% .66 -.04 0 7.1% .66 .006 0.2 %
10000 .315 100% .66 -.04 0 7.2 % .66 .007 0.3 %
Table 6: Numerical results: Beta(2,5) ability distribution with variable π
In interpreting the numerical results given in the above tables, it is important
to keep in mind that as stated above, the pure NHS system performs better
than the fully private system when π(a) falls as a increases. Therefore, when
assessing whether a mixed system is desirable, it is with this pure NHS system
that the mixed system needs to be compared. However, the numerical results we
obtain here are not very diﬀerent from the ones we have obtained in the previous
section except for one case. This occurs with the Beta ability distribution and
the utilitarian objective. In this case the pure NHS system always performs
better than any mixed system. This is due to the fact that the pure NHS system
achieves some redistribution of real income among individuals of diﬀerent risks.
However, the shape of the ability distribution plays a crucial role in that result
since it does not occur with the other ability distribution functions.
7 Conclusions
This paper has investigated whether Besley and Coate’s argument in favor of a
mixed (private/public) system for the provision of some private services applies
to the health care sector when some of its specificities are taken into account.
Besley and Coate (1991) claim indeed that if there are limits to redistribution
(due to the impossibility of implementing lump-sum taxes) it may be socially
optimal to make a private and a public sector coexist, the service provided in
the latter being free of charge but of lower quality. In countries with mixed
health care systems, this lower quality is caused by waiting lists for elective
treatments. In our set-up these waiting lists act as a rationing device to equate
demand and supply in the public sector. However the waiting time for being
treated in the public sector is a pure deadweight loss, that could be avoided
if a benevolent social planner had control over which individuals had to resort
to public health care. The issue is then to know when the welfare gains from
redistribution outweighs this deadweight loss in a mixed system.
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To address this question, we have investigated how the level of social welfare
evolves with the size of the public sector. It turns out that the maximisation
problem we face is not concave (see Figure 2). Accordingly, since the two pure
health care systems (either entirely private or entirely public) are characterized
by the same levels of social welfare in our basic model (sections 2—5), the optimal
system can be either a mixed system (interior solution) or a pure one (corner
solution) in this model. A key finding of our paper is that the dispersion of
the ability distribution in the population needs to be large enough for a mixed
health care system to be socially optimal. Furthermore it is never desirable
to have a small public sector. In our extension to the basic model (section 6),
in which a.o. the probability of being sick falls with ability, the level of social
welfare achieved with an entirely public system outweighs the one achieved with
an entirely private one in which the premium of private insurance is adjusted to
individual illness risk. It is due to the fact that the former system redistributes
across risk classes. Therefore it is with the pure public system that mixed
systems must be compared in terms of social welfare.
Even though in both our basic and extended models a mixed health care
system is socially desirable with a suﬃcient dispersion of abilities in the popu-
lation, our numerical results show that the welfare gains that may be achieved
by a mixed system relative to the best pure system are quiet low; especially for
the Beta(2,5)-distribution which is from an empirical point of view the most
relevant one. The reason is the importance of the deadweight losses caused by
the waiting lists in the public sector, that sort individuals with diﬀerent incomes
between the public and private health care providers.
In this paper, some features of the health care sector have been swept under
the carpet: distinction between diagnosis exams and therapeutic treatments,
uncertainty about the outcome of treatments, information asymmetry between
patients and doctors, adverse selection in the insurance market ... Furthermore
our set-up has concentrated on elective care for which waiting lists occur in
actual mixed systems; clearly, it does not apply to emergency care. Including
these features would complicate the analysis, but we believe would not aﬀect
our qualitative results.
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Appendix
7.1 Derivation of the first order conditions in Section 4
The Lagrange function to the planning problem is
L =
Z aˆ
a
ψ(a)
·
(1− π) v((1− t)a, T,A) + πv((1− t)a, T,A
−λ(aˆ, t, T )
¸
dF (a) +
Z a
aˆ
ψ(a)v((1− t)a, T − πq,A)dF (a)
+µ
½
t
Z aˆ
a
a
·
(1−π)L((1−t)a, T,A) + πL((1−t)a, T,A−λ(aˆ, t, T )
¸
dF (a)
+t
Z a
aˆ
aL((1−t)a, T−πq,A)dF (a)− T−R−πqF (aˆ)≥0,
¾
.
The derivative w.r.t. aˆ is
∂L
∂aˆ
= −π
Z aˆ
a
ψ(a)vNbT (1− t)adF (a)
∂λ
∂aˆ
+ µπt
Z aˆ
a
a
∂LNb
∂λ
dF (a)
∂λ
∂aˆ
+µ
½
taˆ
·
πbLNb + (1− π)bLNg − bLP¸f(ba)− πqf(ba)¾ .
Defining
BNb(a) ≡ 1
µ
ψ(a)vNbT + ta
∂LNb
∂T
,
using the fact that
∂LNb
∂λ
= −
·
∂LNb
∂T
(1− t)a+ 1
¸
(= −∂c
Nb
∂T
),
and collecting terms gives expression (11) in the text.
The derivative w.r.t. t is
∂L
∂t
= −
Z aˆ
a
ψ(a)[πvNbT aL
Nb + (1− π)vNgT aL
Ng]dF (a)−
Z a
aˆ
ψ(a)vPT aL
PdF (a)
−π
Z aˆ
a
ψ(a)vNbT (1− t)adF (a)
∂λ
∂t
+ µπt
Z aˆ
a
a
∂LNb
∂λ
dF (a)
∂λ
∂t
+µ
½Z aˆ
a
[πaLNb + (1− π)LNg]dF (a) +
Z a
aˆ
aLPdF (a)
+t
Z aˆ
a
[πa
∂LNb
∂t
+ (1− π)a∂L
Ng
∂t
]dF (a) + t
Z a
aˆ
a
∂LP
∂t
dF (a)
¾
,
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and that w.r.t. T is
∂L
∂T
=
Z aˆ
a
ψ(a)[πvNbT + (1− π)v
Ng
T ]dF (a) +
Z a
aˆ
ψ(a)vPT dF (a)
−π
Z aˆ
a
ψ(a)vNbT (1− t)adF (a)
∂λ
∂T
+ µπt
Z aˆ
a
a
∂LNb
∂λ
dF (a)
∂λ
∂t
+µ
½
t
Z aˆ
a
[πa
∂LNb
∂T
+ (1− π)a∂L
Ng
∂T
]dF (a) + t
Z a
aˆ
a
∂LP
∂T
dF (a)− 1
¾
.
Performing ∂L∂t +
∂L
∂TE[aL] gives
−E[ψ(a)vTaL] +E[ψ(a)vT ]E[aL]
−π
½Z aˆ
a
[ψ(a)vNbT (1− t)a+ µta
∂LNb
∂λ
]dF (a)
¾µ
∂λ
∂t
+
∂λ
∂T
E[aL]
¶
+tµ
½
E[a
∂L
∂t
] +E[a
∂L
∂T
]E[aL]
¾
Using the Slutsky decomposition ∂L∂t =
∂eL
∂t −
∂L
∂T aL and the definition B(a) =
1
µψ(a)vT + ta
∂L
∂T then gives expression (14) in the text.
7.2 An explicit solution for the optimal tax policy
Making use of the indirect utility functions (15.2) and (16.2), the expression for
social welfare can be written as
SW
E[a]AE[ψ(a)aβ−1]
= (1− t)βκ+ τ(1− t)β−1 − ρ(1− t)β−1γ(ba)
where
τ
def
=
T
E[a]A
, κ
def
=
1
E[a]
R a
a a ψ(a)a
β−1dF (a)R a
a ψ(a)a
β−1dF (a)
, ρ
def
=
E[π(a)]q
E[a]A
and
γ(ba) def= R baa π(a)abaψ(a)aβ−1dF (a) + R aba π(a)ψ(a)aβ−1dF (a)
E[π(a)]
R a
a ψ(a)a
β−1dF (a)
.
The parameter κ is the ratio of a weighted average wage rate to the arith-
metic average; for ψ0(a) ≤ 0, it is smaller than 1. For a given value of ba, the
welfare trade-oﬀ between t and τ is given by
−dτ
dt
¯¯¯¯
dSW=0
= βκ− τ 1− β
1− t + ρ
1− β
1− t γ(ba),
24
which is the labour supply of a representative agent with ability κ and lump
sum income τ − ργ(ba).
Using the labour supply functions (15.1) and (16.1), the government budget
constraint can be written as
τ =
1− t
1− βt
·
tβ − ρϕ(ba)− s+ t
1− tρδ(ba)
¸
(26)
where
ϕ(ba) def= R baa π(a)dF (a)
E[π(a)]
, s
def
=
R
E[a]A
and
δ(ba) def= (1− β)R aba π(a)dF (a)
E[π(a)]
− β
R ba
a π(a)adF (a)
E[π(a)]aˆ
.
Note that with constant π, ϕ(ba) reduces to F (ba).
The budgetary trade-oﬀ between t and τ is then
−dτ
dt
¯¯¯¯
dR=0
= − 1
(1− βt)2
£
(1− β)(ρϕ(ba) + s) + (1− 2t+ βt2)β + ρδ(ba)¤ .
(27)
Replacing in this trade-oﬀ τ by the rhs of (26) and equating it to the welfare
trade-oﬀ yields the following third degree polynomial in t:©
β3(1− κ)
ª
t3+©
β[ρϕ(ba) + s+ ρδ(ba)− 1]− β2[ρϕ(ba) + s− κ]− (β2 + β3)(1− κ) + β2[γ(ba)− δ(ba)]ρªt2+©
(β2 + β)(1− κ) + β2[ρϕ(ba) + s− κ]− β[ρϕ(ba) + s− 1]− (β3 − 2β2 + 2β)ργ(ba) + βρδ(ba)ªt+©
− β(1− κ) + (1− β)ργ(ba)− ρδ(ba)ª = 0
For the general third degree polynomial
a1x
3 + a2x
2 + a3x+ a4 = 0,
let us define Q def= 13
a3
a1
− (13
a2
a1
)2, R
def
= 16
a3
a1
a2
a1
− 12
a4
a1
− (13
a2
a1
)3, S
def
= (R +
√
P )
1
3
and T def= (R−
√
P )
1
3 , with P def= Q3 +R2.
Then if P < 0, the polynomial has three diﬀerent real roots; if P = 0, it has
three real roots of which at least two are identical; and if P > 0, it has one real
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and two complex roots (see Sydsæter, 1981, p 54). Cardano’s formulae for the
roots are then as follows:
root1 = −
1
3
a2
a1
+ (S + T )
root2 = −
1
3
a2
a1
− 1
2
(S + T ) +
1
2
i
√
3(S − T ), and
root3 = −
1
3
a2
a1
− 1
2
(S + T )− 1
2
i
√
3(S − T ),
where i =
√
−1. It turns out that for our model
0 < root2 < root3 < 1 < root1.
The optimal tax rate is therefore root2.
In two simulations (rank-order SW, loguniform distribution, D = 180 and
D = 250) does the highest SW-contour not have a tangency point on the upward
sloping part of the Laﬀer curve (26). Since the SW contours are never nega-
tively sloped (the slope measures the labour supply of a representative agent),
the optimal marginal tax rate must be the rate corresponding to the maximum
of the Laﬀer curve. It is found by solving the second degree polynomial defined
by setting the rhs of (27) equal to zero.
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